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The potential mental health effects of remote control in an autonomous 
maritime world
Kimberly Tam , Rory Hopcraft , Tom Crichton and Kevin Jones
Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Plymouth
ABSTRACT
Many maritime activities, such as loading, unloading and transporting cargoes, consist primar-
ily of long periods of low-stress, with some moments of high stress during complex man-
oeuvres or unanticipated, dangerous, incidences. The increase in autonomy provided by 
machines and AI is beginning to take over certain tasks in the maritime sector, to reduce 
costs and mitigate human error. However, with the current levels of autonomous technology 
available, legislation, and public trust in the technology, such solutions are only able to remove 
majority of tasks associated with low-stress periods. In fact, many current remote control 
solutions still suggest relying on human operators to deal with the complex situations AI 
struggle with. Such a human–automation relationship could endanger the human element. 
The concern is that, if the human user is spending a disproportionate part of their time dealing 
with multiple, unconnected, high-stress tasks, without periods to de-stress, this could increas-
ingly put workers at risk. This paper seeks to highlight potential technical, social, and mental, 
issues that may arise as the sector begins implementing semi-autonomous and fully autono-
mous maritime operations.
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In most occupational contexts, even with the rise of 
automated tools and services, it is well established that 
human error will always be relevant as long there is 
a social-technical element. This is true with the mar-
itime sector, as no matter how prevalent technology 
becomes, the human element will always be a part of 
the picture through training, legal, and ethics issues 
(Kim et al. 2020). Moreover, the role of humans and 
human error with autonomous systems are often 
grossly misunderstood, as human–autonomous rela-
tionships do exist and are often highly complex 
(Porathe, Prison, and Man 2014).
In the maritime industry, which forms a major part 
of the modern world’s wider transportation sector, it is 
estimated that between 50% and 90% of all accidents 
(that result in injury and death) are due to human error 
(Raby et al. 2001; Michael Regan and Stevens 2014). 
The role and rapid evolution of technology in this 
sector continues to change this risk landscape, increas-
ing the types and volume of human error. It is worth 
noting that it is not uncommon for cyber-attacks in this 
sector to be mislabelled as human, or mechanical, error 
instead of an attack (Tam and Jones 2018). That said, at 
the root of many cyber-attacks, like data breaches, is 
human vulnerabilities and error (Safa, Solms, and 
Futcher 2016).
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the 
UN agency charged with ensuring maritime safety and 
security, as early as 1997 identified the relationship 
between crew performance and safety (International 
Maritime Organisation 1997). Later revised in 2003 
(International Maritime Organisation 2003), the IMO 
define crew endurance as the ability for crew to main-
tain performance within safety limits. This performance 
is a function of many complex, interacting variables, 
including individual capabilities, management policies, 
cultural factors, experience, training, job skill, work 
environment and countless other factors. Thereby, sig-
nifying the important relationship between the human 
element and safety, regardless of the number of tech-
nical solutions.
Furthermore, the IMO and others have argued that 
central to human error in the maritime sector, both 
with traditional physical and newer cyber/cyber- 
physical risks, is stress brought on by overall fatigue, 
workloads, and work environment (International 
Maritime Organisation 1993b; Tam and Jones 2019b). 
Therefore, as the sector adopts new technologies that 
drastically alters both working environment and load, 
understanding the changes in stress is critical to miti-
gate human error. However, while there is some 
research into human-autonomy relationships in other 
sectors, there has been a lack of similar works for the 
future of autonomous shipping and smart ports.
While it is important to consider operations at port 
and on ships, it is estimated that approximately 90% of 
human-caused accidents occur in confined waters 
(Cockroft 1984). It would be interesting to see if remote 
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control will balance these statistics in the future by 
reducing the difference in work environment, if both 
port and ship operations are controlled from similar 
office-like control centres or base control station 
(Maritime UK 2018).
Physiological studies conducted in the past, before 
many now commonplace technologies such as ECDIS 
(i.e., Electronic Chart Display and Information System) 
became mandatory, have suggested that complex 
navigation tasks can elicit an acute stress response 
(Cook and Shipley 1980). Technology advancements, 
such as ECDIS, have since then aspired to assist 
humans and are often designed to reduce user stress. 
However, there is concern that the new wave of tech-
nology may be designed to reduce human involve-
ment, enable machines, and consider the human 
element less than systems specifically designed for 
human users.
As stated in other studies exploring stress experi-
enced by mariners, there is very little evidence quanti-
fying stress in contemporary maritime pilotage, let 
alone how the future may affect human mental health 
(Main, Wolkow, and Chambers 2017; Main and 
Chambers 2015). The pilotage phase of the voyage, in 
particular, is typically a critical, high-stress, stage of the 
passage with maximum crewing often in restricted 
channels. That said, during the wider voyage of the 
complete journey there can still be similarly complex 
or high-stress situations, ranging from known (e.g., 
straits) to less know, (e.g., accidents, weather). Given 
that autonomy and remote control have become rea-
lity in shipping, albeit on a small scale, the potential for 
new incidents and accidents may also increase. 
Therefore, understanding the new stressors in mari-
time work environments shaped by autonomy is criti-
cal for protecting mental health and promoting 
a healthy human-autonomy relationship.
It is important to note that a healthy human- 
autonomy relationship does not necessarily mean 
stress-free. More generally, moderate stress levels in 
shipping have been found to positively affect not only 
human productivity but also health and wellness 
(Hetherington, Flin, and Mearns 2006). However, 
today’s seafarers are constantly exposed to stressors 
on-board for several months, and, on average, it seems 
that stress is higher than a normalized onshore popu-
lation (Oldenburg and Jensen 2019; Tony et al. 1997). 
Therefore, if technology evolves while seriously con-
sidering the human-in-the-loop, it is possible that this 
stress could be reduced. However, this would require 
research and awareness of the potential ways stress 
could be increased or amplified since, as mentioned, 
excessive stressors and fatigue often lead to more 
human errors (Arenius, Athanassiou, and Strter 2010; 
Kim and Jang 2018; Liu et al. 2020). For example, sig-
nificant crew workloads could increase fatigue and 
decrease situational awareness, something that has 
been reported to be the main contributor to 23% of 
98 critical vessel and personnel injuries in one year 
(McCallum, Raby, and Rothblum 1996). Other research 
efforts have emphasized the importance of analysing 
cognitive workloads of maritime crews and how 
increased a mental workload is associated with higher 
levels of ship collision risks (Robert et al. 2003; Lochner 
et al. 2018). Therefore, the effects of workloads need to 
be given greater consideration as more crew could 
become remote drivers and supervisors is important.
The remainder of this article is as follows. Section 2 
will discuss the wider context of that autonomy brings 
to the maritime sector. This begins with discussion on 
the levels of autonomy maritime ships may see in the 
near future, and the drivers behind its implementation. 
Section 3 will explore the human-autonomy relation-
ship and discuss the impacts that autonomy can have 
on stress. As there has been similar research in other 
sectors, such as air, comparisons will be made to high-
light some of the stressors crews of autonomous ships 
may face in the future. Last but not least, relevant 
social impacts of autonomy will be considered. 
Section 4 then examines the potential effects moving 
forward, focusing primarily on the change in stress felt 
by human workers in the maritime sector. Lastly, 
throughout Section 4 and 5 a discussion will be had 
on what can be done now, and in the future to ensure 
changes in technology do not further stress the 
human-in-the-loop and instead enhance work 
conditions.
Autonomous shipping
There are several drivers for maritime autonomy, aside 
from the belief that reducing human decision-making 
at sea will facilitate a reduction in human-error trig-
gered incidents. It has been estimated that in the near 
future the potential reductions of annual operation 
costs using autonomous ships could be up to 90%, 
by removing human crew and life support for those 
crews (Morris 2017). These changes could have 
a positive impact on carbon emissions, as slower 
ships on longer voyages would reduce environmental 
impact. If implemented correctly, autonomous systems 
could mitigate traditional stressors (e.g., long hours) by 
providing a better work environment or meet the glo-
bal demands for qualified seafarers (ICS 2019).
However, there are some drawbacks to autonomy 
as it could lead to a situation where a manned ship 
would mean both increased wages, and less attractive 
voyages available to seafarers (Porathe, Prison, and 
Man 2014). Furthermore, fully autonomous ships have 
also been theorized as a way to remove human error; 
however, this may not be as straightforward an asser-
tion as it seems. Many solutions across social, techni-
cal and social-technical domains have been 
developed to minimize human-caused accidents in 
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the maritime industry. Despite this, accident rates 
have rarely deviated significantly over a considerably 
long history.
Comparing other types of autonomous vehicles, 
cars and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), yields 
a similar trade-off between cost and benefit. In the 
public sector, the number of autonomous passenger 
flights is very low, as there are negligible cost savings 
to be had in removing the pilot cockpit while 
a significant increase in risk. There is, however, 
a greater uptake of military UAVs as these save costs 
and lower risk to the physical safety of personnel by 
removing the human pilot. Similarly, most of the push-
back on autonomous cars comes from the presence of 
human passengers and pedestrians, with more incen-
tives to pursue autonomous trucks on long hauls in 
less populated areas. Despite this, both UAVs and trials 
of self-driving trucks have focused on remote con-
trolled solutions, relying on remote pilots and drivers 
for complex manoeuvres (Hancock et al. 2007; 
Clevenger 2019). Similarly, while the benefits of an 
autonomous passenger ferry or cruise ship could be 
considered low, other specializations in shipping could 
benefit more from higher levels of autonomy (e.g., LNG 
tankers).
Therefore, while the sector moves towards autono-
mous ships and ports, humans will continue to play an 
important role, although possibly altered ones, as will 
be discussed in a later section. For example, as long as 
there are manned ships sharing the same physical 
environments, situations will require cross- 
communication and interactions (Ahvenjrvi 2016). 
Moreover, no matter the level of autonomy, mainte-
nance and ship-to-shore operations are still likely to 
include people. This could contribute to both stress 
and human error, meaning even highly autonomous 
systems could be negatively affected by these issues.
It is also important to note that physically servicing 
and interacting with autonomous systems may in itself 
be stressful, as the environment may be hazardous and 
not fit for humans’ long term. However, that is not the 
focus of this article. Instead, the authors are interested 
in: how remote monitoring and control will affect the 
human driver or manager; their role in a “fully” auton-
omous world; and the stress they may experience.
Degrees of automation
Lloyd’s Register was amongst the first maritime stake-
holders to consider autonomy, and initially introduced 
six theoretical autonomous levels for shipping. These 
levels mirrored the SAE definitions for different levels 
of autonomous cars. The IMO has had maritime auto-
mation on their work programme since 2017 
(International Maritime Organisation 2017). As such, 
the IMO have gone through several rounds of discus-
sion to determine the correct number of degrees of 
autonomy which provided enough clarity, while not 
overcomplicating the regulatory process (International 
Maritime Organisation 2018b). To this end, the IMO 
decided upon four different degrees of maritime 
autonomy (DA) (International Maritime Organisation 
2018a) (see Table 1).
These fine-grained definitions have asserted how 
“autonomy” does not necessary mean “unmanned”, 
and that ship or port systems can operate at different 
levels depending on situation and capabilities. 
However, it is important to note that definitions for 
both autonomous cars and maritime systems primarily 
address a human driver/crew and how their involve-
ment decreases as automation increases. Human work-
ers, and therefore human error, are not limited to the 
“driver” or “decision making” roles. Tasks like mainte-
nance and interactions with other manned entities 
(e.g., other ships, offshore structures, scheduling, pas-
sengers, port services), are likely to include people for 
the foreseeable future. One reason for this is that 
systems are not only limited from reaching DA4 by 
technological challenges but distrust in the system 
may prevent full autonomy. This has been seen in 
other sectors, where the main challenges to autonomy 
are often legal, social, political, or ethical (Ryan 2019).
More generally, DA1-2 (and to some extend DA3) is 
already seen today, where tools can provide sugges-
tions and users can delegate some simpler tasks to 
software (e.g., car cruise control). Most solution devel-
opments today are aiming for DA2-3, where humans 
have indirect control of the system and instead primar-
ily play the role of supervisor (Wärtsilä 2017; DNV-GL 
2020). This could be through notifying the system on- 
route of critical events such as weather changes or 
newly declared “no go” zones like an oil spill in action. 
Table 1. Tiers of ship autonomy including exterior human involvement based on (International Maritime Organisation 2018a).
Degree 
of Automation Description Level of human involvement
Degree One Ship with automated processes and decision 
support
Seafarers are on board to operate and control shipboard systems and functions. 
Some operations may be automated and at times be unsupervised but with 
seafarers on board ready to take control.
Degree Two Remotely controlled ship with seafarers on 
board
The ship is controlled and operated from another location. Seafarers are available 
on board to take control and to operate the shipboard systems and functions.
Degree Three Remotely controlled ship without seafarers on 
board
The ship is controlled and operated from another location. There are no seafarers 
on board.
Degree Four Fully autonomous ship The operating system of the ship is able to make decisions and determine actions 
by itself.
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This way people can indirectly, locally or remotely, 
affect the system’s execution of voyage decision- 
making. Therefore, to understand the stressors faced 
by crews it is important to explore this human- 
autonomy relationship further.
The human-autonomy relationship
One of the major components of both traditional and 
autonomous shipping is situational awareness. In this 
paper, the authors determine that situation awareness 
can take on two differing definitions. Firstly, the term is 
defined specifically as an operator’s adaptive under-
standing of their surroundings and context when oper-
ating. Secondly, a much broader definition can be 
adopted, encompassing an understanding of the sec-
tor today and in the near future.
It has been shown that significant technological 
advancements are becoming a critical aspect of situa-
tional awareness. For example, in recent years, indus-
trial robots in manufacturing have evolved to the point 
where they have changed the relationship between 
man and machine to become more reciprocal (Man, 
Lundh, and MacKinnon 2019). In the maritime industry, 
over the years, efficiency, safety, and environmental 
factors have similarly been addressed and reinforced 
by state-of-the-art technologies. Therefore, there is an 
increasing interface between humans and autonomy, 
which leads to the human-autonomy problem.
Automation tends to focus on less complex and 
menial tasks, which aims to lighten human workloads. 
However, despite well intentions, reductions in work-
load could actually cause more issues based on the 
implementation. For example, in experiments for 
autonomous cars, when driver workloads go below 
certain thresholds during automatized driving seg-
ments, drivers can experience what is called passive 
fatigue. This phenomenon is often the result of low 
cognitive loads when the driver does not have direct 
control, decreasing performance (Neubauer et al. 2012; 
Frederik Naujoks and Neukum 2014). When experien-
cing passive fatigue, road drivers are more likely to 
become distracted during high levels of automation 
(Natasha Merat et al. 2012).
In situations of this making, stress is even more 
likely to spike whenever a driver is surprised. This is 
most common when the driver’s situational awareness 
is suddenly proven incorrect, particularity when re- 
engaging with the vehicle or autonomous systems. 
The resulting confusion, trust or distrust in the auto-
mated systems often leads to a poor human decision- 
making in an increasingly stressful, and potentially 
dangerous, situation.
This dichotomy is also known as mode confusion, 
where the discrepancy between drivers 
understanding, situational awareness, and beliefs 
regarding their vehicle’s operations differs from how 
the vehicle is actually operating. This mode confusion 
is highly prevalent in autonomous cars up to level 3 
(Drexler et al. 2018) and UAVs (Werner et al. 2020), 
meaning the future of autonomous ships will be 
equally affected. Not only is there confusion whether 
autonomy is “off” or “on”, but autonomous ships may 
be designed to operate at different levels of autonomy 
depending situations, and these may be triggered 
automatically or manually, as seen in Figures 1,1 pos-
sibly complicating matters.
This is relevant to the maritime sector as, prior to 
autonomy, accidents due to stress and fatigue occured 
when handovers were between just people (Andrew 
Smith et al. 2003). More specifically, it can be surmised 
from accident data (1989–1999) that fatigue-related 
incidences primarily occurred during the first week of 
the voyage, while situation awareness of vessel and 
context were lowest, and during the first four hours of 
a watch after a person-to-person hand-over, even in 
calm conditions for long sea routes. Challenges and 
likely stressors when introducing higher levels of 
autonomy, and therefore remote control, are multi- 
fold.
Firstly, automating the majority of a voyage could 
greatly decrease situational awareness and increase 
fatigue and hand-over confusion. To mitigate this, as 
well as justify salaries and with the nature of remote 
control, the authors predict that, in a future autono-
mous world, one remote crew may be expected to 
oversee multiple autonomous ships. Therefore, 
a remote control environment could increase the 
issue of situational awareness particularly if crew 
need to jump in to control ships possibly in different 
locations and contexts.
As seen in Figures 1–2, this could add further issues 
if incidences happen to occur simultaneously in differ-
ent ships, locations, and situations, adding the stress of 
prioritizing actions and assets. Furthermore, it is possi-
ble that at DA3, when autonomy takes care of most 
tasks, a crew monitoring multiple ships could, on aver-
age, be under stress more often. For shorter sea and 
coastal routes, (Andrew Smith et al. 2003) found that 
seafarers had higher levels of fatigue, with 52.6% of the 
respondents asserting that the stressful conditions 
encountered were potentially dangerous. While this is 
not a direct comparison, these shorter routes, with 
a higher ratio of high to low stress moments, demon-
strates how automating away low-stress periods out of 
longer voyages can be detrimental to seafarer mental 
health. Moreover, in past research, experiment dura-
tion may be an issue, as most which referenced air and 
road used 60–90 min trials, and it is not clear how 
working under these conditions long term affect stress 
1Background image taken from https://www.shipmap.org/
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cumulatively on the order of weeks, months or over 
a career.
Lastly, although rare, it has been reported that peo-
ple may feel motion sickness in simulations, autono-
mous vehicles, and visualizations used during remote 
control. For example, 10% of participating adults often 
experienced motion sickness in autonomous vehicles 
(Byrne and Parasuraman 1996). It has been theorized 
that this due to a dissonance between reality and 
internal beliefs of the car driver (Michael Regan and 
Stevens 2014). This has also been seen in drone pilots 
(Koch et al. 2018) in addition to drivers, or passengers, 
of autonomous cars. Motion sickness could therefore 
be a potential issue for seafarers working remotely. 
Depending on the visuals employed for remote con-
trol, experienced seafarers may feel motion sickness 
without the physical movements they normally associ-
ate with their surroundings, while both experienced 
and inexperienced may feel motion sickness due to the 
dissonance between visual and vestibular inputs (Koch 
et al. 2018). Daily discomfort, even with 10% of users, if 
unmitigated could increase stress, decrease the 
appeal, and result in more incidences. Therefore, it is 
important to consider how realistic situational aware-
ness can be achieved by human operators, without 
adding new stressors.
The reality of remote control
To examine a part of the human-autonomy problem 
one project explored a solution where ships were 
manned while departing and re-entering ports (DA2), 
but unmanned and controlled autonomously with 
remote monitoring and control during ocean passages 
(DA4) (Porathe, Prison, and Man 2014). In this particular 
project, the challenge was to maintain adequate situa-
tional awareness through remote sensors for a shore- 
based crew, as inadequate or confusing information 
would increase stress, and likely human error as well. 
This in itself may be difficult, as there are many 
Figure 1. Possible autonomous situations that one, or several remote crews may be expected to handle when switching between 
modes of autonomy.
Figure 2. Possible workload stress ratio comparison between manned and autonomous ships.
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different elements (e.g., wind, waves) a mariner takes 
into consideration when at sea (Prison, Dahlman, and 
Lundh 2013). It is important to note that the trans- 
oceanic phase, often the least stressful with the excep-
tion of incidences, is the least difficult part of the 
voyage. However, in more stressful situations such as 
rough weather the crew is then expected to increase 
control over the ship to deal with the situation.
If fully implemented a remote control crew may be 
expected to oversee the operations of several ships, 
which could significantly increase difficulties and 
stress. An example of how remote crews may be 
expected to assist operations at DA3-4 for multiple 
assets can be seen in Figure 2. The manned part of 
this image shows one crew per ship. The red sections 
demonstrate moments of high stress on board two 
DA1 ships, particularly during pilotage in and out of 
ports at the start and end of each journey. The high 
stress moments during the middle part of the voyage 
are contributed to difficult manoeuvres, rough 
weather, incidences with other ships, attacks, break 
downs etc.
The second part of the image shows the high 
stress moments that a single crew in charge of 
multiple assets face. This is one area the authors 
would highlight for further research in Section 5. 
Single crews operating multiple assets is a real pos-
sibility in the future as many digital products and 
services have been introduced in the shipping 
industry to access system information and maintain 
control, such as energy-efficient fuel monitors 
(Zhang et al. 2019), unmanned cargo handling sys-
tems automated terminals (Luo, Wu, and Mendes 
2016), and autonomous ships (Ahvenjrvi 2016; Tam 
and Jones 2018; Levander 2017), etc. The growth of 
smart systems continues to shift the human opera-
tor’s role from a traditional controller to 
a collaborator, manager, or supervisor of the system 
(Dekker and Woods 2002). With more equal roles, it 
is important to maintain user-friendly approaches 
but also see if stress can be decreased for the 
human element, and efficiency increased with the 
technical component. However, it is important to 
also consider that at low stress times a single opera-
tor could be in charge of monitoring multiple ves-
sels simultaneously.
If fully implemented, a remote control crew may be 
expected to oversee the operations of several ships, 
which could significantly increase difficulties and 
stress. An example of how remote crews may be 
expected to assist operations at DA3-4 for multiple 
assets can be seen in Figure 2. The manned part of 
this image shows one crew per ship. The red sections 
demonstrate moments of high stress on board two 
DA1 ships, particularly during pilotage in and out of 
ports at the start and end of each journey. Grey repre-
sents periods of low-stress. The high stress moments 
during the middle part of the voyage are contributed 
to difficult manoeuvres, rough weather, incidences 
with other ships, attacks, break downs etc.
The second part of the image shows the high stress 
moments that a single crew in charge of multiple 
assets face. This is one area the authors would high-
light for further research in Section 5. Single crews 
operating multiple assets is a real possibility in the 
future as many digital products and services have 
been introduced in the shipping industry to access 
system information and maintain control, such as 
energy-efficient fuel monitors (Zhang et al. 2019), 
unmanned cargo handling systems automated term-
inals (Luo, Wu, and Mendes 2016), and autonomous 
ships (Ahvenjrvi 2016; Tam and Jones 2018; Levander 
2017), etc. The growth of smart systems continues to 
shift the human operator’s role from a traditional con-
troller to a collaborator, manager, or supervisor of the 
system (Dekker and Woods 2002). With more equal 
roles, it is important to maintain user-friendly 
approaches but also see if stress can be decreased for 
the human element, and efficiency increased with the 
technical component. However, it is important to also 
consider that at low stress times a single operator 
could be in charge of monitoring multiple vessels 
simultaneously.
In terms of technology, at the various degrees of 
autonomy, there is still a question of whether situa-
tional awareness can be maintained by sensors and 
data, no matter the detail or amount, without high 
fidelity. While this aspect has not been thoroughly 
explored for remote monitoring or control, there has 
been similar research in simulations that are worth 
discussing.
A critical element in current simulation technolo-
gies, in maritime and aviation, is high-fidelity so trai-
ners receive accurate mariner and pilot training (Liu 
et al. 2020; Myers III, Starr, and Mullins 2018; Tam, 
Moara-Nkwe, and Jones 2020). Although costly, the 
benefits seem clear when preparing trainees for real 
environment, as highlighted in (Winn et al. 2006) stu-
dents learning oceanography using field experience, 
even with little prior understanding could learn 
quickly.
Simulation, on the other hand, was more effective 
to help students connected with what they have 
learned in other classes. A study involving medical 
students has also demonstrated how high-fidelity 
simulation was not usurious to low-fidelity ones, but 
did also lead students to be overconfident in their 
learned skills (Massoth et al. 2019). It is not clear how 
this may translate to crews moving from local control 
to remote, or the mental effects of being disconnected 
from the environment they are normally immersed in. 
If mariners no longer physically enter environments 
like a ship, and instead employ remote control from 
a centre, fidelity in simulations, cyber-ranges, and 
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visualizations may be decreased without the cost 
justifications.
Major stressors in remote control
Within transport sectors there are two areas of remote 
control, that are most likely to increase stress, these are 
(1) the handover between manual and automation 
and, as previously insinuated, (2) inadequate situation 
awareness, feedback, or response times from vessel/ 
vehicle to control (Porathe, Prison, and Man 2014; 
Larsson 2010). It is important to note that there is 
a precedent for errors within handovers in the mari-
time sector. (Andrew Smith et al. 2003) asserts that 
errors occur during human-to-human crew handovers 
especially during the first week of a voyage as crew get 
used to their surroundings. Thus, also illustrating the 
important relationship between the handover of con-
trol and situational awareness.
The handover between manual and 
automation
Around 75% of all car accidents are consider human 
error as a casual factor, however, it has been shown 
that autonomy brings with it a variety of other chal-
lenges that could actually increase risks regarding road 
safety (Neville and Marsden 1996; Dennerlein, Ronk, 
and Perry 2009). Studies show that prolonged autono-
mous driving periods can contribute to an increase in 
fatigue, with drivers in automated conditions display-
ing a 2% increase in drowsiness when compared to the 
same drivers in manual mode (Hamish Jamson, Merat, 
and Oliver 2013). Other studies have also highlighted 
the link between, driver fatigue, the sudden need to 
perform operations designed to be performed by AI 
and algorithms, and the additional or shifted stress 
that is placed on the remote driver (Shaikh and 
Krishnan 2012).
DA2 is the point at which similar challenges will be 
faced by maritime operators and the handover 
between human and machine. However, in most 
cases the change in DA will not be routine, but instead 
be triggered by an unpredictable situation. For exam-
ple, (Natasha Merat et al. 2014) stressed that most real- 
world handover situations are likely to be unpredict-
able. Under these assumptions, it is important that 
research and studies can determine how best to alert 
drivers of an imminent handover event. This would 
allow an appropriate amount of time for the human 
supervisor to gain an appropriate level of situation 
awareness and switch to human driver, regaining man-
ual driving more efficiently. However, alarm fatigue is 
a real issue in vessel operations and something that 
should be monitored particularly when considering 
adding more, as this could lead to alarms being 
ignored or lost in the confusion (Fan et al. 2017; Lees 
and Lee 2007).
As discussed earlier, there are benefits, especially 
within military UAVs, to employing remote control 
capabilities. However, it is still important to give con-
sideration to the different stressors these controllers 
now face. UAV work is still considered risky and can 
lead to significant psychological stress. All of which can 
be contributed to various factors including mission 
workloads, working hours which may be affected by 
the UAV’s time zone instead of the remote pilot’s, or 
mission-related situations where lives are at stake.
To different degrees all of these may be applicable 
to the remote control of maritime activity, from mili-
tary operations to the shipment of important goods 
(e.g., fuel, medicine, food). While the physical safety of 
UAV operators is more secure, studies have shown that 
pilots’ mental well-being can be severely affected by 
specific stressful tasks (Wayne et al. 2014). UAVs can be 
used in the civilian sector they are frequently for 
inspection and monitoring, and in the military they 
can also be used for reconnaissance and rescue 
(Chappelle et al. 2014; Guznov et al. 2011).
These mental demands have been shown to bear 
consequences such as higher workloads, stress, and 
diminished situational awareness (Chappelle et al. 
2012, 2014; Hancock et al. 2007). More specifically, it 
has been found that 14 to 16% of the UAV operators in 
the US military reported high levels of mental fatigue 
during missions (Wayne et al. 2014; Werner et al. 2020). 
Further existing research shows very little empirical 
experiments in this field, despite demonstrations of 
increased emotional distress among drone remote 
UAV pilots (Valenzano et al. 2018). While there may 
be some overlaps of interest, more generally the con-
text in which remote crew and UAV pilots operate 
differ in operation, outcome, and duration. However, 
if navies develop equivalent drone capabilities, differ-
ences will lessen.
Inadequate situation awareness, feedback, or 
response times from vessel/vehicle to control
Considering that while workers on site or on-board 
may have more traditional stressors, like long hours 
(Raby et al. 2001), their situational awareness may be 
impaired, making critical decisions harder and more 
prone to error (Hancock et al. 2007). This then means 
that as the degree of automation increases, and the 
autonomous systems have more direct control, it 
becomes more important to build human trust in 
these systems. It is not unfeasible to assume that 
there are cases where the system does not know how 
to react to new situations, even with user guidance, 
meaning autonomous systems many need to be 
bypassed. This could be achieved by disabling the 
autonomous systems or, as mentioned above, 
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decreasing the automation level if designed to allow 
different autonomous levels.
However, consider the situation were a local crew or 
are not available to receive and give commands, 
a remote situation room would need to be used 
(Porathe, Prison, and Man 2014). Thus, a suite of tech-
nology is required to support all these human- 
autonomous actions, at all levels of autonomy. This 
suite includes large sensor or IoT networks, which are 
designed to improve remote monitoring and control 
for both machine learning AI algorithms and human 
supervisors.
However, while an increase in devices and data 
could help to lessen operational stress, they also lead 
to an increase in cyber risks leading to misinformation, 
loss of control, delays, damage, and theft (Tam and 
Jones 2019b, 2018) could have the opposite effect 
and increase stress. How to balance the use of technol-
ogy, the new maintenance and cyber issues it causes, 
and the effect on human workers are therefore all 
critical questions that need to be researched in depth.
Social factors
Apart from the technical advancement of the Internet- 
of-Things (IoT), information technology, operational 
technology, and more across all sectors to support 
autonomous systems, there are also social factors 
involved in the human part of the human- 
autonomous relationship. As mentioned previously, 
seafarers face a considerable amount of stress, often 
more than those on shore (Raby et al. 2001; Oldenburg 
and Jensen 2019; Tony et al. 1997). Work hours vary 
greatly depending on job title (e.g., engineering, 
wheelhouse), but all will either have long shifts and/ 
or will always be on call after shift. Seafaring contracts 
typically last between three and nine months, with an 
average duration of voyages increasing due to envir-
onmental regulations. This can be dangerous to phy-
siochemical and physiological functions (Lu et al. 
2010), which is why international maritime labour 
laws say seafarers have a right to return home at the 
end of their contracts, with no cost to themselves (ILO 
2006).
However, longer voyages and current situations 
such as Covid-19 lock-downs and demands continually 
add stress to these situations (Apuzzo and Gebrekidan 
2020). Communication and entertainment technology 
have been introduced to ships to try and mitigate 
isolation and work conditions. In one survey for sea-
farers, 92% said that Internet access strongly affects 
their decision on where they choose to work. This was 
ranked just below necessities such as accurate and 
timely salaries, benefits (e.g., healthcare), training, 
and quality food (Navarino 2018).
While 69% of mariners considered Internet connec-
tivity as a positive effect in 2018, 17% saw new 
technologies as a threat. This could be a reference to 
cyber-attacks, which can take advantage of this con-
nectivity to socially engineer people or attack cyber 
vulnerabilities in both IT and OT systems (Tam and 
Jones 2019b). It varies between surveys, but 
(Navarino 2018) results show 47% of seafarers believe 
they have sailed on a vessel that was the target of 
a cyber-attack. While the initial cyber-attacks are dan-
gerous, growing distrust in systems and information 
can become a troublesome secondary effect. What is 
more, there is evidence that staff are not provided 
adequate cyber risk awareness training, (Markit 2019) 
asserts that in 2019 only 64% of staff received training, 
with 75% rating it as good.
However, distrust in technology could also be 
a reference to social factors, as 53% of seafarers in 
2018 believed that Internet and other crew commu-
nication tools has led to a decline in social interaction 
on board. This factors into both the job aspect, when 
communicating remotely, but also during personal 
time as people may be more likely to reach out via 
the Internet for entertainment and social interactions. 
Due to significant workloads, automating a set of smal-
ler tasks has been well received, however it is not clear 
whether further automating tasks and having humans 
work in potentially siloed centres to support autono-
mous systems could exasperate these issues.
In this survey (Navarino 2018), more than half sea-
farers have also seen at least one element of their role 
automated since 2016, with 98% saying this had 
a positive impact on their role. However, there is 
a significant difference between using the Internet to 
access the outside world from the ship as opposed to 
accessing a ship to execute a task, and there is 
a difference between automating menial tasks versus 
the all or most of a job’s tasks. Given this, in compar-
ison, only 38% of seafarers viewed unmanned ships as 
an opportunity. To meet the demands for seafarers (ICS 
2019), it is important to consider the possible social 
issues and benefits they may face in an autonomous 
world as isolation, workload, work hours, could be 
negatively affected if the focus is on the technology. 
That said, as discussed more in the following section, 
this could also improve these issues and more, such as 
worker diversity (e.g., disabilities, gender balance).
Potential effects
As discussed, the limitations in situational awareness 
and its bearing on human error could still result in 
remote operators misinterpreting information or 
being overly reliant or even distrustful of the autono-
mous systems (Saffarian, Joost, and Happee 2012). This 
leads to poor human–autonomous relationship and 
could cause human-error due to stress and poor hand-
over of information or controls. Within literature 
regarding fatigue and stress, there is a significant 
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amount of studies using controlled laboratory environ-
ment for pilots, mariners, nurses, and more (Allen et al. 
2014; Chinda and Hamer 2008; Hays et al. 1992; 
Foronda, Liu, and Bauman 2013). However, these 
laboratory-based tests do not accurately translate to 
real, specific, contexts. The ratio of high-stress to low- 
stress operations is much higher in simulators, as 
a long flight or voyage can be drastically reduced to 
a shorter, often 90 minutes or less, exercise. Therefore 
more studies on stress outside a controlled environ-
ment, while more difficult, may be needed to fully 
understand this issue.
However, it is important to note that these studies 
did see a clear correlation between stress and the 
complexity or difficulty of a task (Main, Wolkow, and 
Chambers 2017). Therefore, achieving complex tasks 
that technology either cannot do, or humans to not 
trust machines to do, will continue to have significant 
effect on worker stress levels. Examples of guidance for 
human-automation relationships across sectors 
include Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) guidance, 
health care, and computer security (Chen 2010; 
Holzinger et al. 2016). Given Section 3’s awareness of 
the sector and current context, this section attempts to 
determine the possible changes in stress, workforce 
diversity, and training moving forward into an auton-
omous world where human element will still be pre-
sent. Moreover, remote control and monitoring will be 
needed for DA2-3, as full autonomy (DA4) is unlikely to 
be fully realized in the near future, if ever, as seen with 
both autonomous cars and UAVs.
Workforce diversity
If implemented correctly autonomy and remote con-
trol can help enable more workers, increasing work-
force diversity. Remote-controlled robots, or avatars, 
have been created for a number of different situations 
that can be piloted by disabled people who would 
otherwise be unable to perform those actions and 
tasks (Takeuchi, Yamazaki, and Yoshifuji 2020). That 
said, while there is an extensive amount of research 
on how autonomous vehicles can improve the lives of 
passengers, it is less clear on what benefits it could 
have on new, possibly disabled, drivers (e.g., remote 
controlled trucks) (Bradshaw-Martin and Easton 2014). 
As indicated earlier, the reason for this could simply be 
that experiments surrounding autonomous control 
normally use people that have several years of experi-
ence driving instead of participants with no 
experience.
Therefore, it seems current studies on introducing 
autonomy to air, land, and sea tend to focus on the 
transition of the existing workforce into remote control 
autonomy, with little to no focus on the impact of new/ 
minority demographics entering or growing into the 
workforce. This is another research area worth 
exploring, particularly if high, but not fully, autono-
mous vehicles become more common as the work-
force will have a decreasing amount of people with 
real-world experience, and an increase in workers with 
remote access or managing experience. Lastly, much 
like military pilots and truck drivers, seafarers tradition-
ally have had low percentages of women. It has been 
estimated that only 2% of the world’s 1.2 million sea-
farers are women, and with 94% of those working 
solely in the cruise industry (International Maritime 
Organization 2020; Thomas 2004). There is 
a possibility that the change in work environment 
could be both more appealing to prospective female 
applicants, but also lessen social constructs that have 
previously limited opportunities to women in tradi-
tional seafarer jobs and careers.
Furthermore, remote control, especially in the 
higher DAs (3–4) could bring about a change in the 
traditional watches adhered to by on board crew. 
Utilizing office spaces for remote control stations 
frees up the time constraints of operators, allowing 
them to share the burden of operations with others. 
This could potentially lead to operators following 
a more traditional 9–5 working pattern, with others 
taking over in shifts. Following a similar work pattern 
to traditional office based jobs could help to improve 
the diversity of the maritime workforce, by reducing 
the negative appeals of the work to those with families 
or travel limitations.
Training and regulations
It has long been ingrained in IMO practices to consider 
the importance of training and safety. The IMO stipu-
late that the Company should establish and maintain 
procedures for identifying any training which may be 
required in support of the SMS and ensure that such 
training is provided for all personnel concerned 
(International Maritime Organisation 1993a). What is 
more, the IMO have drawn a clear distinction between 
using training as a way to manage the impacts of stress 
and fatigue on crew (International Maritime 
Organisation 1993b). So, while increasing levels of 
automation does not necessarily reduce the number 
of human error-related accidents, it does mean train-
ing should be provided to ensure a greater level of 
maritime safety.
However, standards such as ISO 26,262 only address 
functional safety and not the role of human users and 
interventions (i.e., remote access). Moreover, in most 
difficult, high-stress and high-risk situations, it is not 
technically and/or ethically possible to fully automate 
systems, meaning training and guidance is needed on 
top of stress mitigating strategies. Other studies have 
stated that current managerial procedures do not pro-
vide sufficient support for learning to evolving systems 
within the organisations (Johnson and Andersson 
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2014; Tam and Jones 2019c). Social-culture constraints 
also factor into this situation, as many offshore and 
onshore organizational structures mostly promote top- 
down management, with practitioners often too far 
from key decision-making processes that will affect 
the difficulties and stressors in their duties (Johnson 
and Andersson 2014).
When asked directly, 85% of seafarers either agreed 
or strongly agreed that seafarers will remain an essen-
tial component in the long-term future of shipping, 
even with autonomous ships (Meadow, Ridgwell, and 
Kelly 2018). However, 54% thought many on-board 
roles could be relocated to shore, with many voicing 
doubts about deck and engineering officers. In terms 
of education, 63% agreed or strongly agreed that the 
current workforce at sea could be trained to handle 
remote operations. It is unclear if the participants 
would believe less common worker demographics, as 
discussed in Section 3.2, would feel similarly about 
new generations of seafarers. Within the same survey, 
50.7% of participants strongly agreed that current sea 
and shore-based training will need to be changed to 
prepare the workforce for remote operations of auton-
omous, with 38% in choosing “agree” (i.e., 89% in 
total), with 4.5% neutral and under 4% disagreeing or 
strongly agreeing.
Although this aspect needs to be addressed glob-
ally by the IMO, the International Convention on 
Standard of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
for Seafarers (STCW) has however, as of 2020, has not 
addressed this aspect of seafarers training for the 
future of shipping (Emad, Khabir, and Shahbakhsh 
2020). The MASS regulatory scoping exercise (RSE) is 
primary reason for a delay including autonomy within 
the STCW Convention. The RSE was a systematic 
review of all the major IMO instruments to determine 
the impacts that autonomy (at all levels) would have. 
Following the completion of the review in late 2019 
the next phase of the RSE is to suggest amendments 
to, or develop new, instruments which address auton-
omy (International Maritime Organisation 2020). 
However, (MARITIME UK 2018) provides a brief over-
view of some of the training requirements that crews 
of DA3-4 ships will require.
As mentioned previously, basing any training off of 
experiments may be dangerous as they may biased to 
the current workforce, despite the fact that autonomy 
could significantly diversify and add to existing work-
forces. Similarly, most land and air-based studies in the 
past have hired experienced drivers and pilots. This can 
introduce a new challenge, as moving pilots, drivers, 
and mariners into a 100% remote control environment 
could degrade their sector-specific skills long term. For 
example, in one simulated driving experiment, it was 
found that brief periods of highly-automated driving 
was enough to impair driver performance in 
a subsequent, real-world, manual driving tasks 
(Skottke et al. 2014). This highlights the possibility 
that experienced drivers may perform well in auto-
mated settings, but that their skill to perform those 
tasks may degrade over time when removed from real- 
world settings. It is not clear whether learned skills only 
relevant to remote control were developed. 
Furthermore, it is uncertain what long term effects 
remote control will have on newer workers with mini-
mal experience the real system in the first place. It is 
likely that seafarers with little to no real-world experi-
ence will struggle with some situational contexts they 
have no reference for, but it is also possible that 
remote monitoring and control will develop into 
a separate skill set from previous manned-ship skills.
When discussing training for remote access, there 
are several areas of concern. Both machine and human 
should learn to predict the need of a handover in order 
to mitigate the shock of a transition from machine to 
human, or vice versa, to reduce error. This can be done 
with heightened situational awareness and would 
decrease stress by providing time and information to 
ease the transition as far in advance from a potential 
incident as possible. Training in this area would be to 
teach personnel how to effectively, and passively, 
monitor systems remotely and practice handovers 
and practice the timing. A technical contribution that 
can help with this is well-designed human-machine 
interactions (HMI) so remote workers can have quick 
and easy access to processable situational information 
when a handover is imminent. This must also take 
things like alarm fatigue into consideration, as informa-
tion at the wrong time or a flood of data could lead to 
inaction or a harmful action (Fan et al. 2017). It is also 
very important to education the limitations and 
strengths of the autonomous systems they are control-
ling, as the right amount of trust is imperative (Drexler 
et al. 2018; Saffarian, Joost, and Happee 2012). This 
again highlights how the human-autonomy relation-
ship is more collaborative than previous human and 
maritime technology dynamics, and knowing the 
weakness and strengths of both sides is critical for 
effective partnership (Dekker and Woods 2002).
Future research and discussion
With high levels of autonomy (i.e., DA3-4) solutions are 
becoming more accepted in the maritime sector, there 
are several areas of concern relating to the human 
component of the developing human-autonomous 
picture. This paper has reviewed works showing that, 
because of trust and technical challenges, it is unlikely 
full autonomy will be reached in any sector in the near 
future, if at all. Because of this, it is likely that remote 
access, monitor, and control technology will evolve at 
the same rate as autonomy in order to satisfy high 
levels of autonomy, but with the option to switch 
back to manual. However, existing projects have 
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shown that, because of all of these factors, autonomy is 
mostly likely to automate away “easier” tasks, i.e., tasks 
that were low-stress for people to execute. Given the 
review of existing work above, on stressors in the 
human-autonomy relationship across sea, air, and 
land, this paper discussed the following areas for 
future research which the authors feel like have not 
been fully investigated by other works:
● Approximately 90% of human-caused accidents 
occur in confined waters (Cockroft 1984), hence 
the focus of this paper was on autonomous ships. 
It would be interesting to see if remote control 
will balance these statistics more in the future by 
reducing the difference in work environment.
● What would crew workloads be like if majority of 
low-stress tasks were automated and only primar-
ily high-stress tasks were left to be dealt with 
manually (Porathe, Prison, and Man 2014)?
● With more tasks automated, would crews only be 
assigned one ship and risk fatigues associated 
with long periods of automated inaction 
(Neubauer et al. 2012)? What affect would that 
have to situational awareness during handovers, 
fatigue and stress?
● With more tasks automated, will crews be 
expected to monitor and control more than one 
asset? How would this effect situational aware-
ness during handovers, fatigue and stress?
● Will it be easier for future workforces to be more 
diverse for gender equality and disabled indivi-
duals? Will they handle or react to stress 
differently?
● What are the long-term effects of remote- 
controlling autonomous systems, must these 
skills be built on real-world experience or can it 
be built entirely on remote access training? Do 
both manned and remote skills degrade without 
continuous real-world training (Skottke et al. 
2014)?
● What existing skills can be transitioned to remote 
control, and what new skills need to be created? 
How can be training be improved to teach these 
skills?
The reasoning for these questions can be found in 
previous sections, with the remainder of this sector 
discussing additional areas of future research and 
topics for discussion. Despite the focus on autono-
mous ships here, it is important to examine stress for 
humans in autonomous ports, not only regarding the 
handover between man and machine but also the 
transition of goods from different modes of transport, 
for example, sea to rail. The last three topics to be 
reviewed are how to measure stress, in order to better 
quantify, study, and mitigate stressors, discuss good 
HCIs, which have shown to be critical in optimal 
human-machine interactions in previous studies, and 
lastly cyber security. While each of these are significant 
topics alone, this paper will primarily be looking at the 
aspects that would most affect stress in workers in an 
autonomous world. Another possible area of influence, 
although probably with impact, is ongoing research on 
remote working stressors during the COVID-19 pan-
demic (Hayes and Curran 2020). With a large propor-
tion of people working remotely for parts of 2020, data 
on stress related to remote working is likely to increase 
and lessons learned from this can also be implemented 
in conjunction with autonomous solutions. However 
research in that topic has not yet begun being pub-
lished. Similar, previous, studies have highlighted 
weaker ties with the organization when working remo-
tely (Perry, Rubino, and Hunter 2018), and while 
a member might on average have more ties working 
in a control centre, they may also lose stronger ties 
with those they may have worked with physically clo-
ser. This issue may also be compounded if individuals 
are a part of multiple “remote crews”, as postulated 
earlier.
Limitations in current research
While these studies are useful in ascertaining some of 
consequences of remote control vehicles, they are 
limited as many of these psychological studies have 
mainly centred around perception and experience, not 
measuring stress (Ryan et al. 2010). Furthermore, the 
authors were unable to find any studies in transporta-
tion that measured stress of remote monitoring and 
control, especially when preformed as a full-time job 
instead of a controlled experiment that rarely lasted 
more than 90 minutes. What is more, ships that may be 
designed to operate at different DAs depending on 
situation may complicate this issue, and the fact that 
ships often have longer trips than air and truck, on the 
order of weeks, can create unique issues, which are not 
accounted for in previous studies (Tam and Jones 
2019b).
Other findings from similar transportation sectors 
are limited due to the employment of their test 
subjects and simulated driving methodologies. 
Many of the controlled experiments included 
experienced drivers, but in the long term as more 
pilots, drivers, or seafarers develop their careers in 
an autonomous world, they may not have enough 
real experience to help them navigate simulations 
and remote control actions. Furthermore, to be dis-
cussed further in a later section, there is a concern 
that real-world skills may degrade when working 
remotely and that may negatively affect both 
remote and real-world skills. Therefore, further 
research is needed to ensure a harmonious hand-
over between human and machine.
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Measuring stress
Being able to measure stress is an important part of 
assessing acute stress effects in both experiments but 
also during daily activities. As many past studies have 
focused on short intervals for study, data taken over 
longer periods could give the sector insight into areas 
that have been less addressed. While there are issues 
surrounding this, as measuring stress in real-life situa-
tions could actually add to the stress, modern day 
devices and the IoT may be able to mitigate that. For 
example, in a survey mariners say they have increased 
the number of personal devices they bring on board to 
an average of three per person (Meadow, Ridgwell, and 
Kelly 2018). This includes wearables for measuring and 
tracking fitness, and some of the following stress mea-
surements could use that information to better deter-
mine levels of stress.
Reading mariner biology readings, i.e., bio- 
signals, has two unique advantages over other 
methods such as post exercise surveys, interviews, 
and simulated experiments. Advantages include 
continuous psychophysiological monitoring during 
real-tasks tasks, and the option of acquiring high 
temporal resolution of the measurements, although 
the method for acquiring quality of data should also 
have minimal impact on the participant. Different 
bio-signals are used to detect the psychophysiolo-
gical states. Examples what can be studied to mea-
sure stress are salivary cortisol and heart rate (Main, 
Wolkow, and Chambers 2017; Main and Chambers 
2015). Measuring electroencephalography (i.e., EEG) 
is also another method, which observes the electri-
cal activity within the human brain for stress (Liu 
et al. 2017). This, however, is an example of high 
resolutions achieved, but may not be as applicable 
to real-world experiments as, for example heart rate. 
For further shortened lab exercises or simulations 
however, this method could yield interesting 
research (Liu et al. 2020).
There are limitations to bio-signals from wearables, 
as these results need to be put into operational con-
text. For example, readings that just show heart rate 
over a voyage may be a good indicator of the periods 
of time that crew spent with elevated heart rate. 
However, this data does not ascertain why it was 
high, i.e., what situation or event was occurring to 
initiate that rise. Therefore, measuring stress in this 
way would need to include copious logs and records 
of particular events so that some form of correlation 
could be drawn.
Human-control interaction
To better facilitate handovers and other interactions, it 
is important to determine that the best HCI practices 
and solutions are to enable smooth handovers and 
maintain situational awareness without surprising mar-
iners or inducing alarm fatigue. Optimal human- 
machine interfaces are critical as the main point of 
information and command exchanges between sys-
tem and human supervisor or controller. Examples of 
data needed from remote monitoring and controlling 
of maritime autonomous surface ship (MASS) from 
a BCS can be found here (Maritime UK 2018). The 
right HCI solution might vary between different mar-
iner jobs, not just port and ship, but within those 
contexts. Signals for manual take-overs must carefully 
balance urgency, driver workload, and alarm fatigue. In 
a recent simulated driving study (Zeeb, Buchner, and 
Schrauf 2015), findings showed that tracking eye 
movement during automated driving can predict if 
a person is ready to take over a vehicle. In contrast to 
other studies this is, in a way, a method for the 
machine to gain better awareness of their human 
counterpart. It is also still unclear how multiple unfold-
ing conflicts should be communicated to drivers. In 
a situation where a person is in charge of monitoring 
and aiding multiple assets (e.g., ships) this is an issue 
surrounding unforeseen issues as seen in Figure 2. 
Moreover, different alerts that signalling multiple con-
flicts in a small period of time may confuse the driver, 
potentially delaying reaction time or stressing them 
enough to make an error (Fitch, Bowman, and 
Llaneras 2014). More research surrounding these 
topics in particular is likely needed if industry moves 
to one crew monitoring multiple sets of autonomous 
systems. It is important to also find what information is 
best displayed for the remote monitor (e.g., current AL 
level), and with how much urgency.
Cyber security
Lastly, cyber security is critical for protecting ship 
assets, goods, infrastructure, and workers in the 
maritime sector, onshore or offshore. 
Understanding the security of a remote access 
environment from is critical for preventing both 
attacks and high-stress stress during an attack, 
whether or not it is successful. Maritime-cyber is 
a relatively new field and may need new facilities 
for researching (Tam and Jones 2019a) and training 
(Tam, Moara-Nkwe, and Jones 2020). Similar to the 
issue of training for an autonomous age, a survey in 
(Tam and Jones 2019c) found that 70% participants 
have not had any training cyber security, but 75% 
thought that addition cyber safety training would 
be useful for their tasks. Making sure systems are 
trustworthy despite security risks is also 
a significant, as a hacked system could not only 
stop working, but it could also provide false or 
manipulative information to intentionally change 
human or machine behaviours (Tam and Jones 
2019b). A cyber-attack could therefore significantly 
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damage trust in autonomous systems, which as 
stated in previous studies can cause as many 
human errors as over reliance. It is also unclear 
how quickly a person can regain trust in a system 
if an incident were to happen. That said, it is also 
unclear on how long a person would trust false 
information coming from a system that is normally 
functioning correctly, and how too much trust could 
help hackers in achieving their goals or extending 
the duration of an attack.
Conclusions
Despite some beliefs, the arrival and growth of 
autonomous systems and drivers in the maritime 
sector does not mean the human element will be 
phased out. With the limitations of technology and 
an inherit distrust in autonomous systems dealing 
with difficult situations, full autonomy is likely to 
never be reached at ports or at sea. The sector is 
facing increasing diversification of shipping technol-
ogy and practices, with some old norms disappear-
ing. With this, the range of skill requirements and 
work environment also diversifying. Besides mainte-
nance and other tasks that will need to be done in 
person, it is likely that many existing jobs will be 
remote monitor or control enabled to promote high 
levels of autonomy, but always with the option of 
switching to manned control.
The potential issue is, due to trust and complex 
tasks being more difficult to programme, automated 
systems are likely to be given the simpler, more menial 
tasks, potentially leaving the human component of the 
human-autonomy equation with majority of the more 
complex, and therefore high-stress, tasks. Not only 
could autonomy not reduce human error, but this 
could increase the amount of stress felt by mariners. 
There are a variety of questions that need to be asked 
when implementing autonomous solution, including, 
what skills are required on board if an autonomous 
ship changes DA, what is the minimum staffing level 
required to maintain safe and secure operations and all 
levels of autonomy, where are the personnel respon-
sible for maintaining these systems going to be based?
It is therefore clear that managing stress will be key 
to future shipping, as it has been, but with a different 
emphasis to provide a supportive learning and work-
ing environments. In a review of other sectors and the 
way autonomous systems are growing those contexts, 
this article attempts to highlight real-world concerns 
when moving ahead with autonomous ships in parti-
cular. This article concludes with several areas of future 
research that may be important in creating a healthy 
work environment, and non-harmful workloads, for 
mariners as autonomy continues to develop.
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